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In the contemporary geopolitical order, there are seemingly few states like North Korea.
Continuously made meaningful and problematized in terms of the political and the international, almost every aspect, area or action of this so-called "pariah" or "rogue" state is said to have inherent political dimensions and international repercussions: be it the country's domestic human rights situation, its precarious everyday life or its foreign policy of coercion and nuclear brinkmanship, no matter what North Korea says and does, it affects the state and stability of regional and global politics. While North Korea is in this sense unquestionably an international subject, articulations of secrecy play a crucial role in descriptions of the spaces and spatialities of the country. North Korea is often referred to as the most isolated place in the world, and particular imaginations or, to put it differently, certain imaginative geographies including that of a "terra incognita" (Solarz 1999 ), a "black hole" (Demick 2010) or a "land of no smiles" (Van Houtryve 2009) prevail in the portrayal of the country in international relations.
Citing North Korea's ambiguous and reclusive nature, government officials, scholars and journalists from other countries still struggle to understand North Korea's state of affairs.
The country appears to be a perfect example of the quintessential other of modern globalization, something which defies closer scrutiny because it is unmapped, shrouded in secrecy and secluded from the rest of the world. Interestingly, this assessment is not new. As early as In fundamental ways, North Korea is still a black box. We have some glimpses and some intelligence and the like, but the truth is often times in retrospect some of that intelligence has proven to be wrong. It's a very, very hard target, probably the hardest target we face in the global arena. (cited in Stewart 2010) Of central importance to these characterizations is the claim of missing information. What appears to be certain, both for then (Gates) and now (Campbell) , is that North Korea remains unknown or is unknowable to the outside world. However, equally worthy of mention in this regard is the significance of certain practices for securing knowledge about the country in order to compensate for this paucity of information: visual representations -that is, satellite images. In particular, the implications of what we see -vision -and how we (are made to) seevisuality -are given analytical priority in the paper.
In this vein, the article pursues several goals: First, it shows how satellite images function as powerful spatial imaginaries which mediate a particular notion about a particular territory (see Dodge and Perkins 2009 ). This productive function is possible because seeing is viewed as an authoritative way of knowing. Second, by inverting the commonplace "seeing is believ-
ing" to what can be termed "believing is seeing," the article provides examples that question the authoritative relationship between seeing, knowing and acting. While the truthfulness or accuracy of satellite images is not challenged, the article asserts that it is essential to recognize that such pictures are not self-evident: they alone do not tell us what they mean, what the "right" conclusions are or what has to be done. Third, it intends to advance critical studies in geopolitics by empirically discussing a case that is arguably neglected in this field of 
Visuality, Knowledge and Geopolitics
Remote sensing has a broad range of applications in global politics. It is used, for instance, in armed conflicts, wars and humanitarian emergencies, as well as for international sanctions and drug prevention and environmental preservation efforts (see for example Baker, O'Connell, and Williamson 2001; Baker and Williamson 2006; Dodge and Perkins 2009 ). The academic analysis concerning the use of satellite imagery varies accordingly. Fields that study it include (critical) geopolitics, (critical) security studies, strategic studies, conflict studies, environmental studies and humanitarian studies. Satellite pictures are deeply embedded in governmental, intelligence and military fact-finding missions and decision-making processes. Often they represent the main source of information used in, for instance, the evaluation of weapons (of mass destruction) programs and of proliferation activities on the part of states like North Korea and Iran (see Herman 1996) . Satellite photographs are believed to reveal the stage of development of nuclear reactors and missile bases and to help monitor and track suspicious cargo vessels in international waters. The US-led Proliferation Security
Initiative, which seeks to create a global network to monitor, control and prevent the shipping of weapons of mass destruction, is one example of this.
A number of incidents demonstrate that satellite imagery has consistently and repeatedly played an important role in international politics. Perhaps the most well-known incident in Syrian facility that Jerusalem considered to be a nuclear reactor under construction.
The involvement of the UN Security Council is indicative of the overall dynamics to which images relate and are a part of, as satellite pictures have been central referents in matters related to international peace and security. Against this backdrop, images appear to "speak" security and function as instantaneous communicative acts (Hansen 2011; Williams 2003) . In other words, images are not illustrative and, therefore, secondary to knowledge, but knowledge in their own right. In this vein, they are an integral part of geopolitical dynamics.
This not only makes them legitimate subjects of critical analysis but also highlights the need for careful engagement with the issues and implications of visual representations. Moreover, the episodes described above also aptly summarize what is at stake in these practices of looking. They illustrate the immediacy of the images, the ensuing imperative to respond to them, and the reality that knowledge relies on vision. Remote sensing enables political actors to know what (they believe) another is up to and to act upon what they see or, and this is also important to consider, what they have been allowed to see by others. 2 The case of satellite imagery is a prime example of the links between visuality, knowledge and geopolitics in that it reveals how geopolitical practices are tied to this way of (remote) seeing:
regarded as providing compelling evidence, these pictures allow governments to make legitimate statements, draw conclusions and take political action.
The Authority of Satellite Vision
Traditionally, remote sensing has been the exclusive domain of the state. As a result, satellite images have typically been aligned with official forms of knowledge (Parks 2005 (Marmor 2008) . As a result they provide the observer with a privileged visual angle, one which not only purports to offer a synoptic view of a given landscape or territory but also gives the impression of inherent transparency and controllability and of dominance over what is being observed. In this regard, Dodge and Perkins (2009: 498, italics in original) assert that "satellite images appear to see more of the world, or at least the viewers perceive they are seeing much more […] a fuller view of space; so that you think you can see things you would recognize with the naked eye."
What is important to note is that satellites make visible what people cannot normally see.
Because they are able to reveal hidden, unknown or secret sites, which would otherwise remain invisible and inaccessible to us, their ability to see from above implies a particular power ), a power that can be associated with the establishment of a particular imaginative geography, a specific notion of space and place. As optical devices, satellites not only define the visual appearance and cognition of specific sites, through, for instance, the practice of mapping, but also create imaginations of spatial order. For example, some authors have argued that the camera of the satellite has created a new way of looking, through the adoption of a perspective seen from outer space, which has not only established the icon of the blue planet but also helped to construct the earth as a unitary biosphere and a coherent ecological system (Siemer 2007; Sachs 1994; see also Cosgrove 1994; .
The Geopolitics of Satellite Vision
The defining authority of satellite images is related to their political character. Even though they are understood to provide the observer, as stated above, with "a fuller view of space" (Dodge and Perkins 2009: 498, italics hierarchies, create boundaries and sustain differences which separate, for instance, a "known"
from an "unknown," a "domestic" from a "foreign," or a simple "here" from a "there."
The selectivity of satellite imaging gives cause to ask why specific photographs or visual motifs, and not others, are repeatedly presented and disseminated. For instance, even though intelligence agencies from both the United States and South Korea possess overhead imagery of North Korea's forced-labor camps, no image of them has ever been officially released. Cit- Korea released a report that provided visual evidence of the existence of these camps (Hawk 2003) . What is striking is the fact that since the 1990s high-resolution satellite pictures of North Korea's nuclear and missile sites have frequently been released and referred to by US administrations, thereby contradicting the claim that accurate reconnaissance imagery
should not be shown to the public for security reasons.
Concerning the question of why satellite images of North Korea's nuclear and missile facilities are readily released by governments but those of the country's notorious prison complexes are not, we must ask whether such images are a means to a particular end -that is, whether they serve certain political purposes. For, as Lisa Parks (2001) argues, satellite photographs assume importance only when they have relevance in current international affairs.
Thus, the (comparative) invisibility of these camps is no surprise given the dominance of one geopolitical issue in the Northeast Asian security discourse since the mid-1990s: North Korea's nuclear and missile program. 4 Parks (2001: 597) So what should be considered a characteristic feature of satellite images is that they can either be utilized as compelling sources by various actors or be seen as signifying nothing but a view from outer space.
However, there are also other aspects of satellite imagery that reveal its inclusionary and exclusionary logics. They bring to light the fact that remote sensing is not an innocent mode of representation but is rather open to political appropriation and manipulation. While satel-3
The photographs were so detailed that a former guard had no trouble pinpointing his place of work. He noted, "this is definitely it […] I finished my shift at 2 a.m. Then I drove my truck along this road to the railway station you see there, and followed the road to the Chinese border" (Larkin 2002: 15) . 4 However, several developments in recent years have pointed to increasing political commitments and international attention regarding the (human rights) situation in North Korea. These include the enactment of specific human rights-related laws, the appointment of special emissaries and the growing condemnation of North Korea's human rights violations by national governments and international bodies. Let me say a word about satellite images before I show a couple. The photos that I am about to show you are sometimes hard for the average person to interpret, hard for me.
The painstaking work of photo analysis takes experts with years and years of experience, poring for hours and hours over light tables. But as I show you these images, I
will try to capture and explain what they mean, what they indicate to our imagery specialists. (Powell 2003) While the war in Iraq illustrates how satellite images can be used for manipulative purposes, it also shows that such strategies of deception are enabled precisely as a result of the images' opacity and ambiguity -that is, because pictures lack any inherent meaning. To understand how such images function, it is useful to outline how satellite vision is manufactured and mediated and how it interacts with text and language in the creation of meaning.
The impression that satellite photographs are transparent mediators obscures the complex technical processes that accompany their production. Before they can be presented and viewed in a meaningful way, satellite images are computer-processed in order to correct distortions and to give them their proper visual appearance Campbell 2007; Parks 2001; . Often they are compiled out of parcels of shots from different times; this creates a "genuine" view of a given surface, free from cloud cover. Thus, satellite images originate from a particular day and from a particular time. The synthetic imaging process is due to the vast amounts of data involved. These are transmitted through the electro-optical sensors of satellites to terrestrial stations, where they are converted into a visual form of analysis (Marmor 2008: 318) graphs for the purpose of detecting specific objects and evaluating their significance is based on a number of (visual) methodological categories. These comprise, for instance, the location, size, shape, color, texture and pattern of depicted objects (Baker 2001: 537) . At the National Photographic Interpretation Center, which is run by the US government, over one thousand imagery analysts and specialists work on photographs to decode and make sense of them (Campbell 2007: 22) .
Various accompanying explanations and captions, as well as other graphic and technical tools, not only ensure that satellite images are accessible to a wider audience but also make these pictures comprehensible in a particular way, which in turn narrows the possibilities for 
North Korea: Terra Incognita and Practices of Looking
As indicated above, references to secrecy pervade various parties' approaches to North Korea. Often described as an "enigma" (Halliday 1981) or a "mystery" (Scalapino 1997 
The Spatial Imaginary
People come to know the world -and its spaces and places -through visual imagery. Unknown locations are made familiar through visual representation (cf. Schwartz and Ryan 2003) . Satellite images are one of the ways in which people approach and engage with the world -that is, how they imagine the places and sites of the world. Because they are a means of mapping, watching, ordering and representing the world, satellite images are a pervasive form of geographical knowledge; they make the world knowable. As such they contribute to shaping particular spatial imaginaries.
In terms of visual composition, almost all satellite images reveal similar representational patterns, as they provide a vertical and planar view from above the earth's surface. Exhibiting features of landscape photography and landscape painting, satellite images tend to capture broad territorial spaces within a single frame and convey an enhanced sense of pictorial realism, overt naturalism and colorful diversity (Dodge and Perkins 2009: 498) . Like the genre of landscape photography, satellite imagery permits viewers to control, order and scale a territory into neatly arranged portions (Clarke 1997: 55, 61) . As a result, the satellite image appears as a natural map of an area -one which claims to represent the truth on the discursive authority of cartography and geography.
With regard to North Korea, one satellite image, or more precisely, one visual motif is widely and frequently used (see Figure 1) . It shows the Korean peninsula at night; most of the bright spots are located in the south, while the northern part is almost entirely in the (2010) Also noteworthy is the fact that certain constructed (in)visibilities establish the conditions according to which meaningful statements and conclusions about places, spaces and sites can be made: that what can(not) be seen determines what can(not) be known and said about a locality. Another crucial point is that the subject of the photo is understood to "speak" insecurity and difference (for example, as Rumsfeld states, "It says it all"). It does not communicate any cartographic knowledge, which is one of the most essential assets of remote sensing, but is rather implicated in a particular imaginative geography: North Korea as the place of the great unknown in world politics, a place beyond the realm of comprehension that is neither part of our world nor part of our time.
The repeated use and circulation of this visual motif -North Korea in darkness -in academia, politics and media demonstrate its overarching popularity as an iconic geography. 
Believing is Seeing
Satellite surveillance of North Korea began in the early 1980s, when the US spy satellite KH-11 took pictures of a facility in Yongbyon believed to be a nuclear reactor. The history of the observation of North Korea through satellite vision provides many examples of how the same images can be used to either buttress or refute particular claims regarding the country's military build-up. This is not to argue that remote sensing is completely inaccurate or false, but rather that its data, due to the opaque and ambiguous nature of the images, is prone to divergent interpretations. In this vein, the following section challenges the nexus between seeing and knowing, and hence its repercussions for taking action, by problematizing the possibility of knowing what is "really" going on simply by looking at images. While the uncertainty of (satellite) images contradicts the commonplace notion that the camera never lies, it is important to point out the role of these images in shaping the understanding of certain events and developments related to North Korea. Because such pictures come to have geopolitical implications -they are invoked to legitimize particular decisions and actions, such as inspections, warnings and sanctions -the brief examples will make the case for the need to develop a sensitized understanding regarding the purpose and use of such images.
In the late 1990s, US intelligence agencies spotted what they believed to be a large, secret underground complex near Kumchangri, in North Pyongan Province that supposedly formed the backbone of the regime's efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The evidence consisted of several photographs that had been taken from a reconnaissance satellite, one of which -along with the information that North Korea had revived its nuclear program -was While the South Korean government downplayed the findings -so as to not jeopardize its so-called "Sunshine Policy," which emphasized dialogue and cooperation with the North Korean leadership -the incident, and the demand for onsite inspections, emerged as major points of contention between the United States and North Korea during this period. After months of diplomatic negotiations, North Korea eventually agreed to allow a US team to inspect the underground site in Kumchangri in return for aid concessions (Sanger 1999) . It was the first time that Pyongyang had allowed inspections beyond those at its nuclear complex in Yongbyon.
During two visits to the suspicious site in 1999 and 2000, however, investigators found nothing but empty tunnels, a result that was embarrassing to both the US government and intelligence authorities (Shenon 1999; Risen 2000) . Giving credit to North Korea for its cooperation, Washington officially confirmed that no preparations for the construction of an underground nuclear reactor -something that the images were strongly believed to have shown -could be detected. It was later revealed that the North Korean leadership, when they learned that a US satellite was scanning the site, had mustered thousands of soldiers to simulate a huge construction project in progress (Kim Y. H. 2005) .
A couple of years later, another series of satellite pictures became the subject of an emerg- While for some imagery analysts the pictures simply showed a primitive complex with dirt roads and no visible housing or fuel-storage facilities, government officials from the United States and South Korea warned of underestimating Pyongyang's missile capabilities (Anselmo 2000; AFP 2000; Zakaria 2000) . The FAS, which had purchased the images, concluded in a statement, "it is quite evident that this facility was not intended to support, and in many respects is incapable of supporting, the extensive test program that would be needed to fully develop a reliable missile system" (FAS 2000) . It therefore questioned the need for a US missile defense system and noted, "it is fittingly paradoxical that tens of billions of dollars should have been spent, and a range of national policies reoriented, on account of this distressingly modest and underwhelming missile test facility" (FAS 2000) .
In an indication of how private ways of (remote) seeing challenge the observant vision of sovereign states, the US Department of Defense was compelled to respond as follows:
It is our judgment from a panoply of intelligence sources and methods that go far be- ing superior capabilities ("the all-seeing eye"), it should be kept in mind that they do not necessarily reveal what is seemingly meant to be concealed. Clandestine activities on the ground may be part of a deceptive strategy on the part of the observed to fool the observers and make them believe that something "suspicious" is going on. Satellite images do not tell us whether particular developments on the ground are indicative of genuinely covert activities or whether they are merely a show staged for the watchful eyes in the sky.
Conclusion
Images serve particular purposes. Because they are selective in what they include (and exclude) within their frame of visibility, images and the practice of imaging are both deeply political. Satellite images are no exception. As seemingly realistic representations of the world, satellite photographs are effective tools of persuasion. However, references to, and reliance upon, them need to be regarded cautiously because they are open to specific uses:
either as powerful spatial imaginaries conveying a particular truth about a territory or as subjects for particular appropriations that have geopolitical implications. (Campbell 1998 ).
The questions outlined above point to the necessity of developing a careful and sensitive understanding regarding the uses and functions of remote-sensing data. However, these questions also apply to other modes of overhead imaging: aerial photography and, perhaps more importantly due to the increasing deployment of so-called unmanned aerial vehicles around the globe, drone imagery. Utilized to rebut as many arguments as they can substantiate, visual images are not necessarily able to serve the enlightening function that many readily attribute to them. The case of North Korea provides diverse examples of this, ranging from the ambiguity regarding the number of atomic bombs and storage installations for nuclear warheads to the uncertain presence of nuclear waste sites, proliferation activities, and missile and nuclear tests.
What is also noteworthy is that a moment of revelation, for example, the empty tunnels and the underground system in North Korea, does not end the quest (of the United States) to uncover (North Korea's presumed) clandestine activities. Rather, it actually intensifies this impulse, true to the motto that these things -that is, whatever the actor in question is assumed to be hiding -must be somewhere else instead. This, in turn, makes the search for Further implications for the broader study of visuality in critical geopolitics arise when images are not considered as direct reflections of the world but as interpretations and sentiments thereof. When a picture is based first and foremost on an understanding of which issues or places are entitled to representation, then it is not objective documentation but rather the result of a subjective decision, an interpretive response to how certain circumstances are imagined and framed by the image-maker. Similarly to the writing of a commentary or an opinion piece in order to pursue a particular purpose by promoting or defending a particular position, a picture can likewise be viewed as a statement of belief, a statement of intent and/or as a statement of defense. Accepting that pictures can serve certain purposes has consequences not only for the evaluation of ethical and political responses but also for the very possibility of having them in the first place. When he or she is aware that an image could be a statement of opinion that follows a specific goal, the viewer is able to challenge popular imaginations of, for instance, what constitutes a special place of belonging that affect his or her ensuing response. It follows that it becomes possible to think and act differently, which, in the end, could stimulate the formulation of different (policy) options: in the case of North Korea this is meant in the sense that its people could be seen to be like other people in other countries and that their homeland would not be the great unknown other in world politics, which would legitimize cooperation and engagement regarding the country's containment and isolation.
Accordingly, viewers of satellite images need to be fully aware that these pictures are not only prone to manipulation but have also already been doctored. As Campbell (2007: 23) aptly concludes, "we need to read them [satellite images] critically like any photograph, exploring their production, interpretation and circulation in terms of the political work these supposedly objective regimes or vision support." 
